Has long-run profitability risen in the 1990s by John V. Duca
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After fluctuating in a high range during 
the 1960s and 1970s, the profit share (the ratio
of after-tax profits to output) of nonfinancial
corporations moved within a lower range
through the early 1990s. In recent years, this
measure of profitability has rebounded some-
what (Figure 1), largely owing to strong growth
in corporate profits, which has both buoyed
optimism about the long-run prospects for
American companies—partly reflected by rising
stock prices—and spurred criticism that compa-
nies have profited at the expense of workers
(Bernstein 1995).
Whether the recent improvement is per-
manent or transitory is important for several 
reasons. First, profitability affects the financial
strength of firms and has implications for their
ability to weather downturns. Second, because
retained earnings bolster investment, the per-
manence or impermanence of the recent
improvement will have implications for invest-
ment and thus the long-run growth of the U.S.
economy.
1 Finally, profitability is a key determi-
nant of stock prices, which are important not
only because they are indicators of future eco-
nomic growth but also because they affect
wealth and, thereby, consumption and invest-
ment.
2
This article analyzes the underlying sources
of the recent rebound in corporate profits. Con-
trary to popular perception, virtually all of the
resurgence in corporate profitability during the
1990s reflects a cyclical increase in profits and a
decline in net interest expense associated with
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words, aside from cyclical movements in prof-
itability, much of the recent improvement in
profit share reflects the compositional effects 
of a shift in capital payments away from debt-
holders toward equityholders.
To establish these findings, the next sec-
tion lays out a basic model of corporate profits,
describing ways of adjusting profits for swings
in net interest, the business cycle, oil prices,
exchange rates, and government regulatory
actions. The following sections discuss how 
corporate profitability and its determinants are
measured and included in this model, and 
present empirical results and corporate profit 
measures adjusted for the aforementioned fac-
tors. The conclusion interprets the findings and
discusses their implications.
What determines profitability?
Profits equal revenues minus costs, where
revenues equal the product of prices (P) and
the quantity of output (Y ). Costs include nomi-
nal fixed costs (PF), which equal prices (P)
times real or inflation-adjusted fixed costs (F);
labor costs (WL), which equal compensation
per hour (W ) times work hours (L); nonlabor
variable costs (vPY ), which equal real variable
costs per unit of output (v < 1) times prices (P)
and real output (Y ); depreciation of capital in
nominal dollars (D); and net interest payments
in nominal dollars (I ) to debtholders. In the
long-run, if the capital–labor ratio is fairly sta-
ble, hours worked generally move one-for-one
with output after adjusting for trend productivity
growth. Additionally, if real compensation
moves one-for-one with labor productivity, then
labor costs (WL) are a constant share (w < 1) 
of nominal output (PY ).
3 Combining these de-
tails, the level of nominal profits (P) can be
expressed as:
(1) P = (PY ) – PF – (wPY ) – (vPY ) – D – I
= (PY ) – PF – {[w + v]PY } – D – I,
where w + v < 1 (otherwise profits would be
negative). Dividing both sides by nominal out-
put (PY ) yields an expression for profits as a
share of output:
(2) p = [1 – (w + v)] – F/Y – D/PY – I/PY,
where the profit share p = P/PY and [1 – (w + v)]
< 1. The term [1 – (w + v)] reflects the pricing
power of firms because it depends on the extent
to which prices exceed average, short-run vari-
able costs. The pricing power of firms falls 
the greater the degree of competition, either
from internal sources—which could stem from
deregulation—or from foreign firms—which
could stem from a rise in the real foreign
exchange value of the dollar. Equation 2 indi-
cates that four factors affect profitability: cycli-
cal, relative price, depreciation, and net interest
effects.
Cyclical factors. As real output growth
picks up or as the economy operates at a higher
level of capacity, the profit ratio should rise as
real fixed costs (F) shrink as a share of output
(Y ) and if pricing power varies with the busi-
ness cycle. Intuitively, profits tend to rise rela-
tive to output during economic recoveries and
expansions, because fixed costs are spread over
more output and perhaps also because pro-
ducers may enjoy higher average profit mar-
gins when demand is high. Since the level of
fixed costs other than depreciation is difficult to
measure—in contrast to production—we can
only readily control for output-related swings in
the aggregate income share of fixed costs and in
overall profit margins. Such cyclical swings are
taken into account by including economywide
measures of output growth and capacity.
Relative price factors. Relative prices can
affect profits by altering the pricing power of
domestic firms and by affecting how other costs
vary with output. Swings in real exchange rates
can alter the profit margins of U.S. firms by
changing the relative competitiveness of foreign
products. For example, when the foreign ex-
change value of the dollar jumped in the mid-
1980s, many U.S. firms that produced traded
goods saw the demand for their products
decline because the high dollar made U.S.
exports more expensive overseas and imports
less expensive relative to U.S.-made goods to
Americans in dollars. As a result, U.S. manufac-
turers experienced sharp declines in profits as
demand for their output fell, reducing their 
pricing power and profit margins.
4 In terms of
equation 2, this relative price change affects the
extent to which prices exceed variable costs, as
reflected in the term [1 – (w + v)].
Another important relative price is the real
price of energy, which affects energy-using and
energy-producing firms in different ways. The
change in, rather than the level of, energy prices
is used because profits are more affected by
sudden changes in energy prices than by their
level for two reasons. First, when oil prices rise,
profits fall at energy-intensive firms because it
takes time for them to pass higher input costs to
their customers and because their production
efficiency will decline until they can shift
toward using more energy-efficient equipment4
and practices. In terms of equation 2, this effect
raises the variable cost of output (v). Second,
the profitability of energy producers to some
degree reflects capital gains or losses on inven-
tories and reserves stemming from changes in
oil prices. For example, following a jump in oil
prices, the energy-producing firms will book 
the one-time capital gains on their oil holdings
as profits. It is thus unclear whether the nega-
tive impact of higher energy prices on profits at
energy-using firms theoretically outweighs the
positive impact of higher energy prices on
energy industry profits in practice. This em-
pirical issue is relevant since most high-energy-
using firms and oil firms are nonfinancial
corporations. Because cyclical variables are
taken into account, the inclusion of energy price
changes allows us to assess, after controlling for
the impact of energy on the business cycle,
whether profits tend to be higher or lower dur-
ing recessions induced by rising oil prices.
Depreciation. According to equation 2,
profit share should be negatively related to the
depreciation ratio (D/PY), which largely reflects
the obsolescence of prior investment.
Net interest. A higher net interest ratio
(I/PY ) also lowers the profit ratio. Net interest
would rise if firms borrow more to finance
inventories, if real interest rates rise, or if firms
shift from equity to debt financing.
5 As for the
last factor, the shift from equity to debt in the
1980s and its reversal in the 1990s first lowered
and then boosted the profit ratio because the
profit ratio reflects equity returns and the net
interest ratio reflects debtholder returns.
Inflation. One omitted variable from this
model is inflation. Public finance economists,
such as Feldstein and Summers (1983), have
argued that inflation hurts profits because many
tax code provisions are not indexed for infla-
tion. For example, higher inflation reduces
firms’ ability to depreciate capital for tax pur-
poses because the nominal price of replacing
older capital rises with inflation, whereas the tax
write-offs for depreciation do not.
Data and variables
This section describes how the dependent
and independent variables are constructed. The
profits, net interest, and depreciation variables
are based on data from the national income and
product accounts for nonfinancial corporations,
as financial corporate profits are sometimes 
distorted by short-run shocks (for example,
weather-related insurance costs) or swings in
securities prices associated with unexpected
developments (for example, changes in interest
rates or when banks or thrifts book past loan
losses or capital gains). The other variables fall
into four categories: cyclical, relative price, reg-
ulation, and inflation. Many variables are from
related work by Duca and VanHoose (1996 and
forthcoming).
Profit share. The dependent variable is 
the after-tax profit share (PRAT ) of nonfinancial
corporate output.
6 An income share approach 
to measuring profitability is used because of 
difficulties in measuring the rate of return on
capital, as discussed in the box entitled
“Measuring Profitability: Income Share Versus
Rate of Return Approach.” After-tax, rather than
before-tax profits, are used to assess profitability
from a long-term perspective primarily because
of large, long-term shifts in direct corporate 
taxation (see the box entitled “Should Profit-
ability Be Measured on a Before- or After-Tax
Basis?”). The dependent variable excludes net
interest in its numerator, and net interest enters
the model as a right-side variable because of 
tax and other differences (see the box entitled
“Net Interest: A Component or Determinant of
Profitability?”).
Depreciation. The depreciation ratio
(D/PY) in equation 2 is measured by the ratio
of consumption of fixed capital to output
(DEPRAT ).
Net interest. The net interest ratio equals
the ratio of net interest payments to output
(INTRAT ).
Cyclical variables. To control for cyclical
effects, the models include the t through t-3 lags
of real GDP growth (GDP, GDP1, GDP2, and
GDP3, respectively) and the four-quarter lag of
year-over-year GDP growth (GDPyoy4 ).
7 The
latter controls for medium-term effects of eco-
nomic growth, while using fewer degrees of
freedom than would be the case if one used
four more lags of quarterly GDP growth. In
addition, the current and one-quarter lag of 
the unemployment rate (Ut and Ut –1, respec-
tively) are included to control for the effects of
capacity on profits discussed above.
8 Both types
of variables are included because fast GDP
growth in the early stage of recovery from a
deep recession may not adequately reflect that
the level of fixed costs is high relative to output,
which may not have fully recovered from that
recession.
Relative price terms. Two types of relative
price terms, real exchange rates and real oil
prices, may have large effects on aggregate
profit measures. Real exchange rates, denoted
by RER, are measured using the Federal Reserve
Board’s series on the real trade-weighted valueFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       5 ECONOMIC REVIEW  FOURTH QUARTER 1997
Measuring Profitability: Income Share Versus Rate of Return Approach
Profitability can be measured using an income share or rate of return approach.The former approach measures profits
as a share of output, whereas the latter expresses profits divided by the stock of capital. Each approach has relative
strengths and weaknesses.
In theory, the rate of return approach seems preferable. If returns and capital invested can be accurately measured,
then one can infer the rate of return. In such a case, a rate of return measure is superior to an income share variable
because, in principle, the return on capital can change even if the income share is constant. For example, if capital were
used more efficiently (that is, earned more per unit) and less were invested, then the income share of capital could be
unchanged or fall, even though the return to capital has actually risen.
However, in practice, the income share approach has two advantages over rate of return measures. First, official capital
stock measures for nonfinancial firms are available only on an annual basis, whereas quarterly income share variables are
available.
1 The extra degrees of freedom (almost fourfold greater) allow for more rigorous and complete hypothesis testing.
Second, there are a number of practical difficulties in accurately measuring the capital stock. For example, if an economic
rather than a historical book-value approach to depreciation is used, the capital stock could plummet if the value of some
capital were quickly written off based on shifting asset prices. Indeed, the value of structures in the nonfinancial corporate
sector plunged in the early 1990s when government statisticians used market price data to downwardly adjust office building
values, even though vacancy rates in the early 1990s and mid-1980s were similar. Because profits are measured contem-
poraneously, whereas the capital stock reflects previous investment and depreciation, the measured return on capital in the
mid-1990s looks high largely because the measured rate of return jumped after the stock of office buildings was largely 
written off. However, it is difficult to construct a rate of return measure that tracks the value of the capital originally invested
without distortions from large and uneven write-offs or capital gains.
Another source of measurement error arises with the shift from physical capital to human capital, the latter of which is
more difficult to measure. For example, companies that invest much in research and development (R&D) by hiring scientists
and engineers will appear to be less capital intensive than they really are according to a measure of the physical capital
stock. Since investment is increasingly done in the form of R&D, conventional measures may overstate the real rate of return
on capital by understating the stock of physical plus human capital.Thus, while measuring human capital raises problems for
the rate of return and income share measures of profitability, they likely pose more difficulty for the rate of return approach.
Overall, practical considerations favor using an income share approach, which necessitates using data from the
national income and product accounts.Table B.1 summarizes categories from these accounts and relates them to variables
used in this article.
1 In contrast, Nordhaus (1974) and Feldstein and Summers (1977) use annual rate of return data that provide few degrees of freedom and
limit hypothesis testing.
Table B.1
Nonfinancial Corporate Business Data
This table summarizes the national income and product accounts (NIPA) of the nonfinancial business sector and
relates NIPA categories to the variables used in the empirical model.
How this category affects 1996:4 level in
NIPA category variables in the model billions of dollars
1. Gross domestic product of Used as the denominator of 4194.8
nonfinancial corporate business* PRAT, DEPRAT, and INTRAT
(= lines 2+3)
2. Consumption of fixed capital Used as the numerator of 401.6
the depreciation share, DEPRAT
3. Net domestic product 3793.2
(= lines 4+5+6+12)
4. Indirect taxes and net transfers 415.2
5. Compensation of employees 2788.2
6. Corporate profits with inventory 484.5
valuation and capital-consumption
adjustment (= lines 7+8+9+10+11)
7. Profits before tax 425.9
8. Profits tax liability 148.1
9. Profits after tax Used in the numerator of PRAT 277.8
10. Inventory-valuation adjustment –9.2
11. Capital-consumption adjustment 67.8
12. Net interest Used in the numerator of INTRAT 105.2
* Note that the cyclical variables GDP and GDPyoy in the model differ in that they are based on GDP data for all businesses (not just non-
financial corporations) and are real, not nominal.6
of the dollar, which is based on exchange rates
and consumer prices of the G–10 countries.
9
Although there are broader measures of the real
value of the dollar, this one is used because it is
available over a longer sample period. Before
1968:1, when this series starts, RER equals the
1968:1 level. This useful assumption, which
allows the regressions to start in the 1950s, is
reasonable on two grounds. First, the real value
of the dollar likely stayed in a narrow range
over this earlier period, as exchange rates were
fixed and inflation was low in the G–10 coun-
tries. Second, the inclusion of RER is economi-
cally significant largely because of the dollar’s
big rise and fall during the 1980s, which caused
sizable swings in the profitability of traded-
goods industries. Because exchange rates affect
traded-goods prices with a lag, they often affect
domestic profits with a lag. Accordingly, the
model includes the one- through four-quarter
lags of RER (denoted as RER1, RER2, RER3, and
RER4, respectively).
The other relative price term is the change
in the real price of energy (DOIL), which con-
trols for swings in energy prices. To distinguish
the relative price from the cyclical effects of
changing energy prices, the models include the
t through t-3 lags of DOIL and the four-quarter
lag of the year-over-year change in real energy
prices (DOILyoy4). The real consumer price is
used because the impact of price controls on
wholesale and retail energy prices differed at
Should Profitability Be Measured on a Before- or After-Tax Basis?
Another measurement issue is whether to use before- or after-tax profits in
defining profitability. On the one hand, there are two reasons for using before-tax
profits. First, because net interest is measured on a before-tax basis in the national
income and product accounts, to be consistent, so should profits. Second, in the
short run, sluggish adjustment to swings in corporate taxation could actually result in
before-tax profit ratios being less volatile than after-tax ratios, which may absorb the
short-run impact of tax changes (see Feldstein and Summers 1977). On the other
hand, in the long run, shifts in direct corporate taxation will distort before-tax profit-
ability but not after-tax profitability because competition will eventually force compa-
nies to pass on the changing costs of taxation to their customers and to yield an
equilibrium after-tax return to investors.This issue is important because direct cor-
porate taxation has substantially fallen as a share of nonfinancial corporate output,
from roughly 7 percent in the 1960s to 5 percent in the 1970s and to 3 percent in 
the 1980s and 1990s.
1 More recently, tax changes passed in 1993 (specifically, the
alternative minimum corporate profits tax) increased this tax burden some, putting
pressure on firms to boost before-tax earnings to maintain after-tax earnings for
investors. Given the significance of these changes and because the analysis focuses
on long-run, rather than short-run, movements in profitability, the ratio of after-tax
profits to output (PRAT ) is used to assess whether there is a substantial and lasting
rise in profit share under way.
1 Auerbach and Poterba (1987) discuss tax code changes affecting corporations.
Net Interest: A Component or Determinant of Profitability?
A third measurement issue concerns profits and net interest. At one level, both profits and net interest
are factor payments to capital, implying that profitability should be based on their sum, as in Feldstein and
Summers (1977). Indeed, the large shift from equity to debt in the 1980s implies that the profits were low-
ered then simply because of a shift from one form of capital to another.The high degree of substitutability
of debt and equity in the 1980s is further supported by the fact that much of the buildup in the 1980s in 
corporate debt reflected stock repurchases and the issuance by highly leveraged firms of lower grade
bonds, whose risk profiles some analysts viewed as more like equity than traditional high-grade bonds.The
subsequent deleveraging of the 1990s bolstered profits and lowered net interest, as illustrated in Figure 1.
However, debt and equity are not perfect substitutes. For example, net interest was temporarily
boosted in the 1974–75 inventory-related recession, when firms borrowed more to finance unintended
inventory buildups. In addition, the adoption of lean inventory techniques in the 1990s likely has reduced
the cost of financing inventories. Hence, some of the past swings in the net interest reflect swings or shifts
in (inventory) costs that negatively affect the economic returns to capital. Net interest payments also reflect
swings in real interest rates associated with fiscal policy and/or monetary policy, such as the short-lived
jumps during 1981–82 and 1989–90. In addition, movements in net interest may also reflect how swings 
in inflation affect corporate debt payments relative to income. For example, the net interest ratio may have
been bolstered in the 1981–83 period when rapid and somewhat unanticipated disinflation slowed the
growth of nominal corporate revenues relative to the high interest rates on existing bonds that some cor-
porations had issued during the high inflation of the late 1970s and early 1980s.The net interest and profit
measures used here also differ in that profits are measured on an after-tax basis, whereas net interest is
measured on a before-tax basis. For these reasons, it may not be appropriate to simply add net interest
and after-tax profits to measure the return to capital.
1
Nevertheless, shifts in debt and equity financing imply that the analysis needs to control for movements
in net interest. With these considerations in mind, the ratio of net interest payments to output (INTRAT )
enters as a right-side variable.The more that debt and equity are substitutes, the closer the coefficient on
the net interest ratio should be to 1.
1 While adding net interest to before-tax profits avoids this problem, shifts in corporate taxation make it preferable to use
after-tax profit share in analyzing long-run profitability.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       7 ECONOMIC REVIEW  FOURTH QUARTER 1997
times, energy industry profits moved more
closely with consumer prices, and the speed at
which consumer energy prices react to whole-
sale energy prices has changed. From 1957 to
1996, the real price of energy is the ratio of CPI
energy prices to the CPI. Before 1957, real
energy prices are measured by the ratio of the
energy prices in the personal consumption
expenditures (PCE) deflator to the overall PCE
deflator, where overlapping ratios based on the
CPI and PCE in 1957:1 are used to break adjust
the two series.
Regulatory variables. Because equation 2
omits potentially significant regulatory or tax
actions, the empirical model assesses profit fluc-
tuations stemming from two unusual govern-
ment actions. One dummy, D534 (= 1 in 1953:4),
controls for the one-time plunge in profits dur-
ing 1953:4. Firms booked profits out of that
quarter because it was announced in September
1953 that an excess-profits tax from the Korean
War would end in January 1954. Variables for
subsequent quarters are not needed because
firms apparently booked 1953 profits over sev-
eral subsequent quarters, making it difficult to
construct dummy variables for the “payback”
effects.
Dummy variables are also tested to account
for the Nixon wage–price controls, during
which period price controls affected profit mar-
gins. Specifically, many firms were allowed to
increase prices in response to cost increases
only to the extent that their average profit mar-
gins did not exceed the average of the 1969–70
period. However, profit margins tend to be low
during recessions, such as in the 1969–70 reces-
sion. Thus, the price controls effectively capped
profit margins at low recessionary levels and
delayed a cyclical recovery in profits (see
Economic Report of the President, 1974, 91, and
1973, 65, respectively).
10 Nine separate dummy
variables are used for each quarter when the
controls were in effect (1971:4–73:4, denoted
D714 –D734 ) because a single dummy for
1971:4–73:4 will not reflect how the different
phases of the controls and their ability to bind
changed in this economic recovery.
11
Inflation. To assess the impact of inflation
on profitability, two inflation terms are tested:
the year-over-year CPI inflation rate (INFyoy)
and the four-quarter lag of this inflation meas-
ure (INFyoy4 ). Year-over-year measures are used
because inflation may show some short-run per-
sistence, whereas including eight separate quar-
terly lags instead would use up many degrees of
freedom and make it difficult to observe any
persistent and significant effects of inflation.
Results
Empirical model. Based on equation 2 and
the discussion of possible regulatory and infla-
tion effects on profits, the baseline empirical
model used is
where Greek letters denote estimated coeffi-
cients. The baseline model excludes the infla-
tion and Nixon wage–price dummy variables, 
as both are statistically insignificant. As a check
that potential simultaneity bias is not altering
the basic qualitative results, a version of the
baseline model is also used, which replaces
contemporaneous DEPRAT and INTRAT with
their one-quarter lags, drops contemporaneous
GDP and DOIL, and drops Ut but adds the two-
quarter lag of U. Although some of the newly
lagged right-side variables became statistically
insignificant, the long-run trends in profitability
are similar when profits are adjusted for the 
estimated effects of swings in the business
cycle, oil prices, and exchange rates. Results
from models with nonlagged variables are pro-
vided because profits are very sensitive to eco-
nomic developments, and fits of models using
contemporaneous values are better than those
using lagged variables.
Regression results. Regression results are
presented in Table 1, in which models 1 and 2
include time-trend variables, unlike models 3
and 4, and in which models 2 and 4 include
inflation terms, unlike models 1 and 3. As this
table indicates, the after-tax profit ratio is very
sensitive to the business cycle in every model.
Faster GDP growth boosts the profit ratio, as
does a lower unemployment rate, which reflects
tighter capacity. The negative sign on Ut and 
the positive sign on Ut–1 reflect that profits are
reduced by the current level of and change in
the unemployment rate. From a technical per-
spective, the negative sum of the coefficients on
the U lags reflects the negative effect of a lower
level of capacity on profits, while the positive
sign on the one-quarter lag actually reflects the
negative effect of a decrease in capacity.
12
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Regression Results for Models of After-Tax Profit Share
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
constant .167** .160** .167** .159** .168**
(9.54) (8.92) (9.34) (8.40) (9.30)
INTRAT –.804** –.750** –.807** –.753** –.767**
(–4.17) (–3.92) (–3.95) (–3.65) (–3.76)
DEPRAT –.248* –.306** –.247* –.302** –.248*
(–2.16) (–2.66) (–2.15) (–2.62) (–2.15)
GDP .163** .157** .160** .155** .162**
(5.09) (4.95) (4.99) (4.88) (5.05)
GDP1 .136* .129** .134** .129** .133**
(4.02) (3.79) (3.91) (3.72) (3.85)
GDP2 .094** .086* .097** .090* .090*
(2.64) (2.39) (2.64) (2.42) (2.49)
GDP3 .093** .085* .098** .092** .091**
(2.83) (2.56) (2.92) (2.66) (2.73)
GDPyoy4 .042
+ .038
+ .051* .047* .042
+
(1.92) (1.70) (2.18) (1.98) (1.90)
Ut –.0032** –.0032** –.0033** –.0033** –.0032**
(–3.16) (–3.24) (–3.21) (–3.29) (–3.14)
Ut–1 .0024** .0024** .0024* .0023* .0023*
(2.65) (2.62) (2.47) (2.46) (2.39)
DOIL .032** .031** .033** .032** .034**




(2.04) (1.89) (2.01) (1.86) (2.09)
DOIL2 .058** .055** .059** .056** .062**
(4.21) (4.00) (3.75) (3.57) (3.93)
DOIL3 .042** .039** .042** .038* .046**
(3.17) (2.86) (2.73) (2.47) (3.01)
DOILyoy4 .026* .024* .021
+ .019 .027
+
(2.56) (2.36) (1.76) (1.58) (2.59)
RER1 –.0001 –.0000 –.0001 –.0001 –.0001
(–1.07) (–.64) (–1.18) (–.77) (–1.14)
RER2 –.0001 –.0001 –.0001 –.0001 –.0001
(–1.35) (–1.04) (–1.41) (–1.11) (–1.36)
RER3 .0000 .0000 .00003 .0000 .0000
(.17) (.40) (.30) (.53) (.15)
RER4 –.0003** –.0002** –.0003** –.0002** –.0003**
(–3.67) (–3.07) (–3.54) (–2.98) (–3.68)
D534 –.016** –.016** –.016** –.016** –.016**
(–7.32) (–7.46) (–7.26) (–7.38) (–7.33)












2 .978 .977 .978 .977 .978
r .876 .952 .877 .952 .882
D.W. 1.97 2.02 1.94 2.00 1.97
Q(24) 22.49 15.51 24.12 16.86 22.28
F(t,t
2) 3.27** 3.23** 3.22**
F(INFyoy,INFyoy4) .75 .76
**(*,
+) denotes statistical significance at the 99 percent (95 percent, 90 percent) confidence levels.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       9 ECONOMIC REVIEW  FOURTH QUARTER 1997
signs on DOILyoy4 and lags of DOILt –I suggest
that higher oil prices boost profits. However,
higher oil prices also lower output and thereby
profitability. For this reason, the energy coeffi-
cient estimates do not reflect that real oil price
increases probably hurt profits by inducing
recessions, effects that are picked up by the
cyclical variables. For this reason, it is best to
interpret the energy coefficients as indicating
that once the negative cyclical impact of higher
oil prices is taken into account, higher real oil
prices tend to boost profits. Put another way,
nonfinancial corporate profits have tended to
fall less in oil-induced recessions than in non-
oil-induced recessions, once the overall magni-
tude of the recessions is taken into account by
cyclical variables. One plausible explanation is
that, after controlling for cyclical effects, energy
company profits are apparently bolstered by
capital gains on oil reserves by more than prof-
its of oil-using companies are reduced, most
likely because oil companies book substantial
capital gains on oil reserves in the former type
of recession.
With respect to the other relative price vari-
ables, results also indicate that a real exchange
rate appreciation lowers the profitability ratio
with about a four-quarter lag, often through
reducing the competitiveness of traded-goods
industries. Because most of the statistical sig-
nificance of the real exchange rate variable
reflects the large hump in the dollar’s value in
the mid-1980s, and because subsequent move-
ments in the dollar’s value have been smaller in
size, the effects of exchange rates may be less
precisely estimated than the standard errors and
t ratios imply.
The estimated coefficients on the net in-
terest ratio are worthy of more confidence, not
only because net interest changes have occurred
in several instances but also because the esti-
mated coefficients are plausible. The fact that
the coefficients are under 1 (roughly 0.8) for the
after-tax profit share—coupled with results
from other regressions (not shown), which indi-
cate that the net interest ratio has a 1–1 effect on
before-tax profit share—implies that after-tax
profits and net interest are not perfect substi-
tutes largely because of tax differences.
Results for regulatory variables are mixed.
For example, the tax dummy for 1953:4 is
always statistically and economically significant,
indicating that the tax-cut announcement of
1953:4 cut the profit ratio by about 1.6 per-
centage points. On the other hand, the Nixon
price-control dummy variables are jointly insig-
nificant, as indicated by F statistics testing the
joint significance of these dummies in models
corresponding to models 1–4.
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In contrast to the price-control variables,
while the time terms (t and t
2) are jointly signif-
icant, their inclusion does not alter the qualita-
tive regression results, as is reflected in Table 1,
and the general movement in the adjusted profit
ratio (not shown).
Perhaps at odds with the public finance 
literature on inflation and corporate taxation,
the inflation variable is statistically insignificant
(see models 3–5). This result also arises using
the shorter sample of 1953:1–79:4. In other runs
that omit statistically significant energy price
variables, inflation is significant but with a
counter-intuitive positive sign. This result likely
reflects that, in the absence of energy price vari-
ables, CPI inflation is spuriously picking up
changes in real energy prices stemming from
omitted variable bias. Another reason for the
lack of a negative and significant effect of infla-
tion on profit share may be that changes in the
tax code (particularly in 1981 and 1986) render
the effect of inflation uneven over long samples.
As a result, it may be difficult to find a statis-
tically significant effect of inflation on profits
without adjusting for tax code changes in some
way. In light of this plausible explanation, the
findings indicate that inflation may not add
information about the after-tax share of profits
in the presence of cyclical and relative price
terms and in the absence of accounting for tax
code changes.
Has the underlying trend in 
profits changed much?
Using the regression results, one can
address the questions of whether and why the
underlying trend in after-tax profit share has
changed much in the 1990s. To do this, one can
adjust profit share by subtracting from it the 
estimated impacts of the business cycle (GDP
growth and unemployment rate effects), real oil
prices, real exchange rates, regulatory variables,
and swings in net interest. As shown in Figure
2, this adjusted profit ratio fell from the late
1970s to mid-1980s and since then has fluctu-
ated in a range that is noticeably below that of
prior decades.
14 Interestingly, the profit perfor-
mance of the 1970s differs little from that of the
1950s and 1960s on an adjusted basis, in con-
trast to the unadjusted data. This difference
mainly reflects that the cyclical performance of
the 1970s in terms of GDP growth and unem-
ployment was noticeably worse than that of the
prior decades and that interest rates were higher
as well.10
With respect to the late 1980s through 
the mid-1990s, virtually all of the run-up in the
unadjusted profit ratio is due to swings in the
business cycle and net interest, as demon-
strated by the flatness in the adjusted profit ratio
plotted in Figure 2. Much of the unadjusted rise
stems from a huge decline in net interest since
the late 1980s, which may largely be a long-
lasting effect if the deleveraging of the early
1990s does not reverse itself (and also if real
interest rates do not trend higher from the 
levels of the mid-1990s).
To a large extent, swings in the use of
leverage reflect changing risk assessments and
the development of new financial markets. For
example, the rise of leverage in the 1980s partly
reflected the further development of the junk
bond market, more optimistic assessments of
the risk posed by increased leverage, and the
increased use of debt to finance an increase in
corporate takeovers and mergers. The subse-
quent deleveraging of the 1990s likely reflected,
in part, how the unexpected recession and
credit crunch of the early 1990s induced an
upward reassessment of the risks of leverage
and spurred a shift toward using stock swaps
and relatively less debt to finance takeovers and
mergers.
Because the impact of the recent net inter-
est swing conceivably may persist for some
time, whereas cyclical swings appear to be more
short-lived, it is helpful to look at the after-tax
profit share adjusted only for net interest effects,
as shown in Figure 3.
15 Consistent with the plot
of profit share adjusted for cyclical and net
interest swings in Figure 2, the net interest-
adjusted profit share has moved in a lower
range since the mid-1980s. Indeed, recent read-
ings are well below the high points reached in
the later phases of prior business expansions,
such as in 1955, 1958, 1966, and the late 1970s.
The fact that adjusted profits have moved
in a lower range over the 1980s and 1990s raises
the question, Why did profitability fall after the
Table 2
Which Sectors Face Much Higher Competition Since the 1970s?
SIC Sector
1 Major Changes Boosting Competition in Particular Industries
Agriculture ———
Mining Oil & Gas: Oil prices deregulated by a series of presidential executive
orders beginning in 1979, and natural gas prices deregulated in phases by
the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978.
Construction ———
Manufacturing Increased openness to trade, partly from GATT (1979, 1993),
Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement (1989), and NAFTA (1994).
Transportation Trucking: Liberalization of truck rates in the late 1970s and the Motor
Carrier Reform Act (1980).
Airlines: The Airline Deregulation Act (1978) allowed entry in 1982 and
deregulated air fares in 1983.
Railroads: Deregulated by ICC liberalization of rail rates in the late 1970s
and the Staggers Rail Act (1981).
Communications Telephones: Largely deregulated following the ATT court settlement of 1982.
Cable Television: Deregulated in a series of FCC rulings in the late 1970s
and by the Cable Television Deregulation Act (1984).
Telecommunications: Partly deregulated by Telecommunications Act (1996).
Utilities Electricity: Wholesale deregulation enhanced by Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission rulings (1996).
Wholesale ———
Retail Department Stores: Rise of discount store chains and electronic shopping.
FIRE (Finance, Insurance Banking: Partly deregulated by the Depository Institution Deregulation
and Real Estate) and Monetary Control Act (1980) and the Garn-St. Germain Depository
Institutions Act (1982).
Service Health Care: Innovations in the form of HMOs and managed care in the
1990s.
1 Standard Industry Classification (SIC) of sectors at the 1-digit-level classification code.
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1970s? One plausible, but unproven, explana-
tion is that a number of factors have heightened
the degree of competition facing firms. In turn,
greater competition may have speeded up the
pace of capital depreciation as firms more
quickly replaced aging capital to match their
competitors. This possible effect of greater 
competition may be reflected in the adjusted-
profit ratio because the effect of depreciation
was not subtracted from the raw-profit ratio in
constructing the adjusted profit ratio in Figure 2.
In addition, lower pricing power could arguably
boost the shares of output going to other 
factors, such as variable costs, as firms extract
less economic rent from other factors of pro-
duction.
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What could have caused a rise in the
degree of goods market competition since the
1970s? One often mentioned reason is height-
ened global competition. While trade flows
imply that this should have been more of a 
factor in the 1970s, when the ratio of imports
relative to GDP rose most prominently, import
penetration during the 1970s may have induced
U.S. firms to cut profit margins in the 1980s 
after losing market share in key traded-goods
industries.
However, nontraded-goods industries have
arguably become more competitive as well. For
starters, a number of industries experienced
greater competition stemming from deregula-
tion in the late 1970s and early 1980s, including
the trucking, railroad, telephone, and airline
industries (Table 2). More recently, the devel-
opment of new information technologies may
have enhanced competition in the information
processing industry and reduced the costs to
customers of shopping for the lowest prices. In
addition, the development of new health care
delivery organizations and changing cultural
attitudes have enabled health care restructuring
to open up the medical industry to more price
competition in the 1990s (see Frech 1996).
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It is not certain why the adjusted after-tax
profit share has not recovered to the range of
the 1950s–70s. Nevertheless, developments
suggest that increased goods market competi-
tion has played a role. For example, anecdotal
reports in Federal Reserve Beige books in the
1990s suggest that inflation has remained low,
in part because intense goods market competi-
tion has made it difficult for firms to raise prices
(see Duca and VanHoose 1996).
Conclusion
This article finds that the rise in the after-
tax profit share of nonfinancial corporations
during the 1990s largely stems from a cyclical
recovery in the U.S. economy and a decline 
in the net interest ratio often attributed to
deleveraging and lower interest rates. In this
sense, it is not clear that a long-lasting increase
in the economic returns to capital has occurred,
after accounting for the returns to debtholders
Figure 2
Adjusted and Actual After-Tax Profit Shares






















NOTES: The adjusted profit share equals the actual profit share
minus the estimated effects of swings associated with
the business cycle, the Korean War profits tax, real
exchange rates, real oil prices, and net interest, as esti-
mated by model 1 in Table 1.The shaded areas denote
recessions.
SOURCES: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and the author’s 
calculations.
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NOTES: The net interest-adjusted profit share equals the actual
profit share minus the estimated effects of swings associ-
ated with net interest, as estimated by model 1 in Table
1.The shaded areas denote recessions.
SOURCES: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and author’s 
calculations.12
and equityholders and short-run, cyclical-related
movements.
Although the financial strength of U.S.
firms may not appear to have improved much
based on the adjusted profit share variable, the
deleveraging of the 1990s, as reflected in a
lower net interest ratio, has improved the ability
of firms to meet debt payments in the event of
a downturn (see Bernanke, Campbell, and
Whited 1990). Findings also suggest that much
of the recent rise in the U.S. net investment rate
owes less to a permanent jump in profitability
and more to other potential factors, such as the
business cycle, transitory rises in profits, or less
crowding out of investment due to a lowering
of the U.S. budget deficit. As for stock prices,
the findings do not necessarily imply that stock
prices are over- or undervalued, because prof-
itability is only one of the three key determi-
nants of equity values, the others being interest
rates and risk preferences.
18
Findings do, however, indicate that the
after-tax profit share of nonfinancial corpora-
tions is not directly affected by inflation,
although this result could stem from changes in
the tax code, which may have altered the effect
of inflation on profit share. Nevertheless, this
finding does not necessarily imply that the level
of profits is not hurt by inflation. In particular,
low and stable inflation may indirectly boost the
income going to each share of production, with
factor income equaling a factor’s income share
multiplied by output. By creating an environ-
ment of stable and sustainable growth, boom–
bust cycles in production are curtailed, which
keeps output closer, on average, to its sustain-
able path and indirectly curtails cyclical swings
in factor shares. Indeed, with respect to the 
former channel, growth and inflation have been
smoother under the Federal Reserve’s forward-
looking low inflation policy in effect since the
early 1980s.
Notes
I would like to thank, without implicating, Jean Zhang,
Jeremy Nalewaik, and Justin Marion for providing
research assistance and Mike Cox, Stephen Prowse,
and Evan Koenig for making helpful suggestions.
1 See Meyer and Kuh (1957) and Fazzari, Hubbard, and
Petersen (1988).
2 The Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index is a component
of the index of leading economic indicators, based on
evidence that stock prices are indicators of future eco-
nomic growth—for example, see Bosworth (1975) and
Duffee and Prowse (1996). Stock market wealth has
been shown to affect consumption (see Mishkin 1977)
and is used in many econometric models of consump-
tion and investment, such as those used by the
Federal Reserve Board and DRI/McGraw-Hill.
3 When compensation is deflated by an overall price
index for consumption and business goods, rather
than simply for consumption goods, real labor costs
trend with productivity, as shown in the 1996 Economic
Report of the President, 60–61.
4 Several studies of how exchange rates affect traded
goods, such as Mann (1986), have found a role for
imperfect competition in which exchange rates and
pricing power are related.
5 Crabbe, Pickering, and Prowse (1990) analyze the
shift in the 1980s from equity to debt.
6 Profits exclude capital consumption and inventory-
valuation adjustments. Results are similar using before-
tax profits—see Duca and VanHoose (forthcoming).
To include as many business cycles in the sample
as possible, the after-tax profit ratio was created 
by splicing two series: one based on data revisions
associated with the shift to chain-weighted GDP data
affecting data starting in 1959:1 and the other based
on earlier data not affected by this rebenchmarking.
Both real and nominal data on corporate profits before
1959 will be revised when pre-1959 estimates of real
chain-weighted GDP are released. Using overlapping
data over 1959:1–4, a break-adjustment ratio was 
calculated. Multiplying the earlier data by this ratio
eliminates a small level shift between 1958:4 and
1959:1 when the two series are spliced together. 
A similar procedure was used to create break-adjusted
series for the depreciation ratio (DEPRAT ) and the net
interest ratio (NETINT ).
7 For values of GDP variables involving pre-1959 data,
growth rates were based on 1987 GDP because pre-
1959 chain-weighted GDP data are not available. This
splicing was done to include as many business cycles
as possible to help estimate cyclical effects.
8 By including both lags, the model effectively includes
current unemployment and the change in unemploy-
ment. To control for the 1994 change in the employ-
ment survey, which boosted the unemployment rate 
by 0.2, 0.2 is added to the unemployment rate before
1994:1.
9 The G–10, or Group of Ten countries, includes
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
10 Gordon (1972, 411, Table 5, line 5e) estimates that the
controls reduced the before-tax profit ratio by 1.25
percentage points for nonfinancial corporations over
1971:4–72:2.
11 By contrast, the Korean War wage and price controls
did not limit price rises based on profit margins, were
imposed in an expansion, and did not cap profit 
margins at recessionary levels. By stabilizing the gap
between prices and costs at its prewar, expansionaryFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       13 ECONOMIC REVIEW  FOURTH QUARTER 1997
level, these controls stabilized profit margins at levels
typical of an economic expansion. Hence, unlike the
Nixon price controls, dummies for the Korean War
price controls are not needed.
12 Denoting the coefficients on Ut and Ut–1 as b1 and b2,
respectively, the unemployment effects can be reex-
pressed as (b1 – b2)Ut + (b2 Ut – b2 Ut–1) º (b1 – b2)Ut
+ b2DUt.
13 The controls had a larger, but still jointly insignificant,
effect on before-tax profit share in regressions not
reported in the tables. The coefficients on the control
variables in these regressions indicate that the con-
trols depressed the before-tax ratios by about 1.25
percentage points, near Gordon’s (1972) estimate for
the effects in the first three quarters. The inclusion of
the price-control variables is qualitatively significant in 
the before-tax runs because it affects the estimated
cyclical effects. Specifically, the unemployment rate
variables are only marginally significant when one
excludes the price-control dummy variables from the
model but very significant otherwise. However, this
result is not too surprising, given that there is good
reason to believe that the controls forestalled a cyclical
recovery in profit ratios in the early 1970s.
14 Two different scales are used in Figure 2 because esti-
mated effects of selected regressors reflect the means
of these variables and because the model is estimated
with a constant. For our purposes, it is the trend of
adjusted profitability that matters.
15 Unlike the trend in the income share of before-tax 
profits plus net interest, the trend in the share of after-
tax profits adjusted for estimated net interest effects
(shown here) is less susceptible to being distorted 
by the big declines in direct corporate taxation since
the 1960s.
16 Flatness in labor share suggests that the coefficient w
in Equation 2 has not risen.
17 For example, health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) are less vulnerable to malpractice suits than
traditional health providers and are thus more able to
adopt cost-saving practices. The increase in health
insurance premiums in the 1980s induced firms to
curb medical costs. Given the sensitivities surrounding
health care and time needed to reform practices, the
rise of HMOs lagged this need. The impact of HMOs
on corporate competition is limited to the extent that
health services are delivered by proprietorships and
partnerships.
18 In theory, stock prices equal the present value of future
earnings minus a “risk premium” to pay investors for
risk, where the present value formula adjusts earnings
for interest that could be earned from bonds. Thus,
stock prices should rise when earnings’ forecasts rise,
interest rates decline, or risk premiums fall. The risk
premium equals the price of the risk times the amount
of risk, and seems to have declined since the 1970s
(see Blanchard 1993). Aside from whether the price 
of risk has fallen, one explanation for the apparent
decline of the risk premium is that the volatility of stock
returns—a measure of risk—has dropped since the
1970s (see Davis and White 1987 and Hickok 1996). 
It is unclear whether the risk premium has fallen
enough to justify equity prices, because it is hard to
disentangle the market price of risk from the actual
degree of investment risk and to accurately measure
each of these elements.
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